ACCELERATE **CHICAGO**

Craft software with confidence in 2026


Protecting Your GitHub

Agentic DevOps Guild

Membership Now Open

Accelerate Your AI Adoption for DevOps

The Agentic DevOps Guild prepares you for building AI-assisted CI/CD and infrastructure automation. Membership includes courses, workshops, and recurring meetups for engineers ready to improve the speed of CI/CD, master AI tooling, and learn the techniques that *safely* enable AI-assisted DevOps work.

Join 40+ Teams Meeting Weekly




WE ARE
BAD AT
SECURING
AUTOMATION
TOOLS
DEVOPS
ANOTHER
INCIDENT
PREVENTED
SUPPLY CHAIN
THREAT DETECTED

These are good things, but will not save you from today's attacks

- CVE scanning
- 2-factor auth for humans
- signing commits
- OIDC short-lived tokens
- Using another CI besides GH Actions

The (not so) new GitHub attack vectors

- Submitting a PR
- Submitting an Issue
- Commenting on an Issue/PR
- Compromising an Action you use
- None of those attacks was possible until automation was enabled
- Compromising a developer with access to any of the above

What are they (mostly) after?


- Everyone: Actions secrets!
  - GitHub PAT, npm PAT, AWS/Cloud PAT, Docker PAT, etc.
  - Wait, GitHub PAT? I thought we use ephemeral GITHUB_TOKEN?
  - PAT is still required for some workflows that GITHUB_TOKEN doesn’t cover.
- Popular public repos: Sneaking in code via old branches, cache poisoning, or dependency

If you left after this slide, the 80% TL;DR

- Never use pull_request_target in a workflow yaml file
- Always add permissions: {} to root of every workflow
  - Manually add each permission to each job
- Pin all Actions to a sha
- Scan for Actions updates daily with dependabot/renovate (7 day cooldown)
- Run scanners actionlint, zizmor, poutine, and gasa often
- Move all secrets to GitHub environments to limit blast radius


Attack Type 1: Malicious PR from Fork

1 The setup




Maintainers use pull_request_target to run automation with secrets and write permissions.

2 The opening move



An attacker forks the repo and opens a PR that looks normal.

3 The foot-gun




The workflow checks out the PR's code and runs scripts from it—combining untrusted code with trusted credentials.

4 The payload



The PR contains a script/hook/step that runs in CI and can access secrets, tokens, or the GitHub API.

5 The win condition



Attacker gains secrets, repo write access, or pivots to supply chain compromise.

Defending the PR

- Never use pull_request_target, esp. in public
- Require permissions: {} in workflows with allow-list in jobs
- Prevent external contributors from auto-running workflows
- Use GitHub environments for secrets in workflows
- Both Grafana Labs and Spotipy were taken over by this attack type

Attack Type 2: Hacked 3rd Party Action

1. You use a popular Action and pin to the latest version



Your workflow uses a widely adopted Action and pins to a version (e.g., @v3).

2. Hacker gets into that Actions repo, likely via PR → Workflow




Attacker opens a PR in the Action's repo. The PR triggers their workflow, giving them code execution in that project's context.

3. Hacker exfils secrets, then merges PR with exploit and creates new signed release with your automation




The workflow steals secrets (PATs, tokens, etc.). Attacker merges the PR, adds the exploit, and publishes a new signed release using your automation.

4. They move git tags to their new commit, so old releases are infected too



With stolen PATs or a new PR workflow, they move git tags (e.g., v3) to the malicious commit, so existing "old" versions now point to the exploit.

5. Your next commit pulls the old version with the exploited code and now attacker exfils your secrets too, poisons cache



Your workflow fetches the "old" version (now malicious). The code runs, exfils your secrets, and can poison caches/artifacts for future runs.

Defending your workflows

- Always sha pin Actions
- Use Renovate / Dependabot to update Actions
- Use 7-10 day "cooldown" to protect against malicious releases
- Require permissions: {} in workflow root
  - Then allow-list in jobs (set r/o default)
- Use GitHub environments for secrets in workflows
- tj-actions and Trivy scanner were taken over by this attack type


Attack Type 3: Actions as a gateway to npm, brew, etc.

1 Attacker sneaks a URL into postinstall script for npm package via PR




Attacker opens a PR that adds a malicious URL to the postinstall script of the npm package.

2 Actions workflows publish new npm release (or they just exfil npm PAT and publish later)




GitHub Actions publishes a new npm release using the workflow (or attacker exfiltrates npm PAT and publishes later).

3 npm package doesn't contain any malicious code so it doesn't trigger alerts



The published package looks clean —no suspicious files or code. Only the postinstall script contains a new one-liner.

4 When someone `npm installs`, postinstall will download that malicious code and installs it on your system




When users run `npm install`, the postinstall script executes, downloads the malicious payload, and installs it on their system. npm has no record of this external code.

Defending yourself from dependencies

- Migrate to pnpm
- Global: npm config set ignore-scripts true
- Project: echo ignore-scripts=true >> .npmrc
- Package: npm install <package-name> --ignore-scripts
- Some way to add cooldown to package updates?
- Axios, PostHog, Zapier, Postman were caught by this (Shai Hulud)


Attack Type 4: Action prompt injection

1 You want to use Claude, Copilot, Codex, etc. to make judgement on an Issue label




A workflow is triggered to have an AI agent review the issue and apply the correct label, priority, or take action.

2 You add Agent as a workflow step. It has full privileges in that workflow, including secrets.



The agent runs in the workflow with the same permissions as the workflow, including access to secrets, tokens, and write permissions.

3 Attacker prompt injects via Issue, Comment, or PR



The attacker hides instructions in the content. The AI agent, following the prompt, is manipulated into executing malicious actions.


4 Their prompt convinces agent to exfil data, secrets, or write changes



The agent uses its full privileges to leak data, access secrets, or modify the repository—all as part of the workflow. No alert is triggered.

Defending yourself from prompt injections

- Use GitHub Agentic Workflows for anything that needs an Agent 🔗
- Else, your automated agent needs guardrails
  - Sandbox agent inside (at least) a container
  - Or sandbox with nono.sh 🔗
  - Filter inputs/outputs to/from agents
  - Firewall agent egress


Codex token
api-proxy
Docker container
agent
Docker container
http
gh-aw-firewall
Docker container
http
gh-aw-mcpg
Docker container
stdio
GitHub MCP
Docker container
chroot/ host
Host Docker Socket
GitHub PAT

Things are changing fast at GitHub

- 74 changelog posts this month!
- 70 changelog posts on just Actions and supply chain this year
- Multiple new security features showed up just last week
- GitHub has pulled in lots of Microsoft people to help combat outages and security

Priorities for Private Repos

- Don’t use pull_request_target, just don’t, please
- Set permissions: {} in root of all workflow yaml files
- Set Actions permissions to read-only by default
- Set Actions approvals to “Require approval for all external contributors”
- Pin all actions to a sha
- Scan for Actions updates daily with dependabot/renovate (7 day cooldown)
- Move all secrets to GitHub environments to limit blast radius
- Audit repository read access: Read = Fork & PR permissions
- There’s now a setting to only allow PR create with write permissions

Priorities for Public Repos

- all those concerns, and more:
- NEVER use pull_request_target
- Consider closing PRs to external contributors
  - Issues are the new contribution
  - Agents write the code

My new audit tool: "gasa"

GitHub Actions Security Assessment 🔗
https://github.com/BretFisher/gasa

- Codifies this talk's advice into a golang cli scanner
- Checks workflows for top 3 issues
- Checks top 4 repo settings that affect actions security
- Checks that your updating actions (Renovate/Dependabot)

My GHA workflow editing skill 🔗

- npx skills add bretfisher/skills

Linters to run on workflows

- actionlint
- zizmor
- poutine

Resources

- Bret's content
  - Agentic DevOps Guild https://www.bretfisher.com/theguild
  - Agentic DevOps Podcast https://agenticdevops.fm/
  - gasa https://github.com/BretFisher/gasa
  - GH Actions Skill https://github.com/BretFisher/skills
- Tools
  - GH Agentic Workflows https://github.github.com/gh-aw/
  - Zizmor Workflow Scanner https://zizmor.sh/
  - Poutine Workflow Scanner https://github.com/boostsecurityio/poutine
  - Actionlint Linter https://github.com/rhysd/actionlint
  - nono sandbox https://nono.sh/